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II.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This is an appeal of a Final Judgment and Order of the Third
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, dated June 7,
1994 granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Utah

Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k).

1

III.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether Plaintiff established "actual knowledge" under

Title 75-7-406 U.C.A. on the part of Defendant or its agents and
whether it was necessary to establish actual knowledge in this
case.
2.

Whether Plaintiff has standing.

3.

Whether Plaintiff's

claims are barred by applicable

Statutes of Limitation.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Each of the three issues presented for review poses a question
of law and was determined by summary judgment.

Consequently, all

three issues have the same standard of review.
A summary judgment may be affirmed only when "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

Baumgart v. Utah Farm

Bureau Ins. Co.. 851 P.2d 647, 651 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Utah
R.Civ.P. 56(e)).

In reviewing a summary judgment, the appellate

court must "construe all facts and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the losing party, and review
independently issues of law."

Baumgart, at 651; See also:

Ron

Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah
1989).
In determining whether the trial court properly

granted

judgment as a matter of law, the appellate court must "give no
deference to the trial court's view of the law; [and] review it for
2

correctness." Id, at 1385; See also: Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d
403, 404 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted); and Bonham v.
Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). A challenge to summary judgment
"presents

for

review

conclusions

of

law

only,

because,

by

definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual issues . . ."
Morganf at 499.

Consequently, said conclusions are reviewed "for

correctness, without according deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions."
(1988).

Id, (citing Madsen v. Borthick, 97 Utah Adv. Rep

"That same lack of deference applies to the trial court's

interpretation of statutes, which likewise poses a question of
law."

Id, (citing Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988) •
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IV.
DETERMINATIVE RULES
The determinative rules in this case are as follows:
Rule 56(b) and (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as
to all or any part thereof.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in
an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.
The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed
by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
A party waives all defenses and objections which he does not
present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he
has made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that
the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable
party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense
to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at
the trial on the merits, and except (2) that whenever it
appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the
court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court
shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made
at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b)
in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
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V.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. This action was filed in the Third District Court of Salt
Lake County/ State of Utah by Anna Lee Anderson as Plaintiff on the
6th day of December, 1990.

Plaintiff sought damages against

defendants for breach of contract, tortious interference with
contract, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.

(Rec. 1-12).

2. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint
on the 15th day of April, 1991 pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6)-(7) and
19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, claiming Plaintiff lacked
standing to bring suit and had failed to join an indispensable
party.

(Rec. 40).

3.

The trial court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

without oral argument on the 16th day of July, 1991 (Rec. 91).
4.

Prior to the execution and entry of the Order granting

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint
naming David M. Dudley, Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust as
Plaintiff

with

Defendants.
5.

the

same

causes

of

action

alleged

against

(Rec. 92-104).

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended

Complaint on the 7th day of August, 1991 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure claiming that Plaintiff's
claims were barred by applicable statutes of limitation.

(Rec.

139).
6.

After hearing on September 16, 1991, the trial court

granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
5

(Rec. 213).

7.

On approximately September 27, 1991, the trial court

entered its order dismissing Plaintiff's case,
8.

(Rec. 218-19).

Plaintiff appealed the two orders of dismissal, which

appeal was determined by the Utah Court of Appeals on or about
December 22, 1992.

(Rec. 252).

9. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial
court, specifically finding that Plaintiff, as the beneficiary of
the subject Trust, had standing to bring this action. The Court of
Appeals further found that it was unnecessary to address the
statute of limitations issue.
10.

(Rec. 253-58).

After the case was remanded for further proceedings,

Plaintiff brought a Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendants
on or about March 30, 1994.
11.

(Rec. 928-29).

Subsequently, on or about April 25, 1994, Defendants

brought a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff.
(Rec. 1279-1280).
12.

After hearing on May 16, 1994, the trial court denied

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment by Minute Entry dated May 17, 1994.
(Rec. 1641-42).
13. The Final Order from which Plaintiff appeals was executed
by the trial court as of June 7, 1994 on July 11, 1994. (Rec. 171719).
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VI.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On November 20, 1978, the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement
was executed by the Trustor, Norman Anderson.

See, Affidavit of

James E. Morton, Para. 3 (Rec. 1036); Depo. of James Norman
Anderson, pp. 86, 88 (Rec. 1043-44).
2.

Following the creation of the Norman Anderson Trust, an

account was set up for the Trust at the Salt Lake City branch of
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

See, Affidavit of James E. Morton,

Para. 4 (Rec. 1036); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke, p. 8 (Rec. 1045).
3.

Defendant, Ralph Pahnke, was the stockbroker engaged to

manage the Norman Anderson Trust Account.

See, Affidavit of James

E. Morton, Para. 4 (Rec. 1036); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke, p. 8 (Rec.
1045).
4.

Dean Witter policy in force at the time the Norman

Anderson Trust account was opened required that a copy of the
complete

trust

document

including

amendments,

letters

of

resignation or appointment of successor trustees, etc., be secured
and submitted to the Dean Witter Operations Center for review and
approval. Seef Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 5 (Rec. 1036);
Depo. of Kathy Barnett, p. 18 (Rec. 1046); Dean Witter New Accounts
Procedure, Para. S, p. 17.16 (Rec. 1047).
5.

Following the establishment of the Norman Anderson Trust

account at Dean Witter, and pursuant to the new accounts policy of
the firm, the Trustee delivered a complete copy of the Norman
Anderson Trust Agreement to Defendant Pahnke on or about November
7

20, 1978,

See. Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 6 (Rec. 1036);

Depo. of Ralph Pahnke, pp. 9-10 (Rec. 1048-49).
6. Following delivery of the Norman Anderson Trust Account to
Dean Witter Reynolds, the trust document was forwarded to the
Regional Operations Center for review.

See, Affidavit of James E.

Morton, Para. 7 (Rec. 1036); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke, pp. 10-11 (Rec.
1050-51).
7.

During the period

in question,

Kathy Barnett,

the

operations employee responsible for reviewing trust documents,
would review approximately 100 trust instruments per day.

Ms.

Barnett has no recollection of having reviewed the Norman Anderson
Trust Agreement when it was submitted for approval. £>ee, Affidavit
of James E. Morton, Para. 8 (Rec. 1037); Depo. of Kathy Barnett,
pp. 14, 16 (Rec. 1052-53).
8. At the time of her deposition, Kathy Barnett admitted that
the scope of review of trust instruments was greater than what was
testified

to

in

her

Affidavit

submitted

in

Plaintiff's original Motion for Summary Judgment.

opposition

to

See, Affidavit

of James E. Morton, Para. 9 (Rec. 1037); Depo. of Kathy Barnett,
pp. 44-46 (Rec. 1054-56).
9.

Moreover, Ms. Barnett testified that there is no written

policy governing the review of trust instruments by Dean Witter and
that she would, on occasion, deviate from her standard review of
trust instruments.

.See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 10

(Rec. 1037); Depo. of Kathy Barnett, pp. 72-73 (Rec. 1057-58).
10. Following review of the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement,
8

the Norman Anderson Trust Account was approved for a "cash account"
only.

See. Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 11 (Rec. 1037);

Affidavit of Kathy Barnett, Para. 11, Exhibit 2 (Rec. 1061 and
1066).
11.

In connection with the review of trust documents and

approval of trust accounts, specific Dean Witter Reynolds policies
provide as follows:
a. Because of the varying and complex laws which
govern fiduciaries, it is mandatory that Dean Witter
obtain the proper legal documents, when dealing with a
fiduciary. This is necessary in order to determine (1)
that the fiduciary has been properly appointed; and (2)
that he is authorized by law and the instrument which
appoints him to open a securities account; and (3) that
he is authorized to act with regard to a particular
transaction (i.e. option, commodity, margin, etc.). The
Branch Operations Manual, New Accounts Section,
identifies the documents required in each particular type
of fiduciary account. The Branch Manager must make sure
that, prior to the execution of an order for such an
account, the proper documents have been received and
approved by the individual in his Operations Center
delegated to review legal documents.
The Operations
Center will contact the Legal and Compliance Department,
when necessary, for direction and guidance regarding the
authority of a particular fiduciary as it relates to
certain transactions in his account. See, Affidavit of
James E. Morton, Para. 12 (Rec. 1037); Depo. of Gregory
Taylor, p. 99, Exhibit 2-D (Rec. 1067-68).
b.
...most fiduciaries may not enter into
speculative transactions, such as margin, short, option
or commodity transaction unless specifically authorized
by the instrument from which they derive their powers
(trust document, court order, etc.)... If a fiduciary
exceeds his authority, a transaction may have to be
rescinded. See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 13
(Rec. 1037); Depo. of Gregory Taylor, pp. 94-95, Exhibit
2-C (Rec. 1069-1071).
c. Current Dean Witter policy requires that trust
documents be specific if the trust document is to engage
in margin or options transactions.
If the original
instrument does not so provide, it must be amended. See,
Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 14 (Rec. 1037); Depo.
9

of Gregory Taylor, pp. 92-93, Exhibit 2-B (Rec 10721074).
d. Dean Witter Reynolds' policy, based on advice
from legal counsel, does not permit a trust account to
conduct margin, option or commodity business unless the
trust document states the appropriate word - "margin",
"option" or "commodity". Such words as "encumber" or
"hypothecate" or the phrase "to borrow money" cannot be
accepted in lieu of the specific word - "margin",
"option" or "commodity".
See, Affidavit of James E.
Morton, Para. 15 (Rec. 1038); Depo. of Gregory Taylor, p.
17, Exhibit 2-A (Rec. 1075); Dean Witter New Accounts
Procedure, Para. T, p. 17.16 (Rec. 1076).
e. Generally trust accounts are limited to cash
only business unless (1) the trust document specifically
authorizes the speculative powers of margin, option or
commodity trading.. .. See, Affidavit of James E. Morton,
Para. 16 (Rec. 1038); Depo. of Gregory Taylor, p. 17,
Exhibit 2-A (Rec. 1077); Dean Witter New Accounts
Procedure, p. 17.15 (Rec. 1078).
f. If a trust account wishes to conduct margin,
option or commodity business, only cash transactions can
be placed in the account until such time as [the
Operations Center] reviews the trust document and
approves the account for margin, option or commodity
trading. See. Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 17
(Rec. 1038); Depo. of Gregory Taylor, p. 17, Exhibit 2-A,
Dean Witter New Accounts Procedure, p. 17.15 (Rec. 107980).
g. If an existing account is conducting margin or
option business, the Margin Department will not journal
positions and/or funds to the new trust account unless
[the Operations Center] has approved the trust document
for margin or option trading. See, Affidavit of James E.
Morton, Para. 18 (Rec. 1038); Depo. of Gregory Taylor, p.
17, Exhibit 2-A (Rec. 1081); Dean Witter New Accounts
Procedure, p. 13.72 (Rec. 1082).
12.

The Norman Anderson Trust Agreement was never submitted

to the Dean Witter Operations Center for approval for margin
business. See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 19 (Rec. 1038);
Depo. of Kathy Barnett, pp. 34-35 (Rec. 1083-84).
13.

The Norman Anderson Trust Account was approved for cash
10

business only which means margin transactions within the trust
account would not be permissible.

See, Affidavit of James E.

Morton, Paras. 20-21 (Rec. 1038); Depo. of Kathy Barnett, pp. 34-35
(Rec. 1085-86); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke, p. 13 (Rec. 1087).
14. Notwithstanding the failure to extend approval for margin
business in the Norman Anderson Trust Account, Dean Witter began to
process margin transactions in the account in the Spring of 1979,
shortly following the death of Norman Anderson in March, 1979.
See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 22 (Rec. 1039); Depo. of
Ralph Pahnke, p. 18 (Rec. 1088).
15.

In approximately August, 1979, a request was made by the

Compliance Department of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., to review the
Norman Anderson trust document.

The document was retrieved by

Kathy Barnett and forwarded to an individual named "Linda Z" in the
Compliance Department.

See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para.

23 (Rec. 1039); Depo. of Kathy Barnett, pp. 76-79, Exhibit 7 (Rec.
1089-93).
16.

Dean Witter cannot state the purpose for which its

Compliance Department requested a copy of the Norman Anderson Trust
nor the extent to which the document was reviewed by the Compliance
Department

See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 23 (Rec.

1039); Depo. of Kathy Barnett, pp. 76-79 (1089-93).
17.

The proceeds from the margin borrowing out of the Norman

Anderson Trust Account were used inter aliar to purchase a new
Mercedes Benz automobile for the personal use of the Trustee of the
Norman Anderson Trust. See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 24
11

(Rec. 1039); Depo. of James Norman Anderson, pp. 147-48 (Rec. 109495).
18. The Norman Anderson Trust required that upon the death of
the Trustor, Norman Anderson, the assets therein were to be
deposited into two subordinate trusts created thereunder, to-wit:
the Norman Anderson Family Trust and the Norman Anderson Marital
Trust.

See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 27 (Rec. 1039);

Depo. of James Norman Anderson, p. 86, Exhibit 15 (Rec. 1100-1122).
18.
19. The Trustee of the Norman Anderson Marital Trust and the
Norman Anderson Family Trust was identical to that designated in
the Norman Anderson Trust and the powers of the Trustee were
identical to those conferred on the Trustee in the Norman Anderson
Trust.

See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 27 (Rec. 1039);

Depo. of James Norman Anderson, p. 86, Exhibit 15 (Rec. 1100-1122).
20.

Neither the Norman Anderson Trust, the Marital Trust or

the Family Trust authorized the Trustee to conduct margin business
or made any reference to the word "margin".

See, Affidavit of

James E. Morton, Para. 27 (Rec. 1039); Depo. of James Norman
Anderson, p. 86, Exhibit 15 (Rec. 1100-1122).
21.

In approximately, April, 1980, the Trustee of the Norman

Anderson Trust found an expensive home in Holladay, Utah, which he
wanted to purchase. He contacted Defendant Pahnke and informed him
of his desire to purchase the home.

Defendant

Pahnke then

indicated that in order to obtain the funds, it would be necessary
to come into his office and sign a document which would authorize
12

the transfer of the trust funds out of the Norman Anderson Trust
account and into accounts from which the Trustee could borrow.
See. Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 25 (Rec. 1039); Depo. of
James Norman Anderson, pp. 280-81 (Rec. 1096-97).
22.

Upon arriving at Mr. Pahnke's office, a letter entirely

in Mr. Pahnke's handwriting, and on Dean Witter stationary was
presented to the Trustee for his signature (hereinafter referred to
as the "Letter of Authorization")

See, Affidavit of James E.

Morton, Para. 25-26 (Rec. 1039); Depo. of James Norman Anderson,
pp. 280-81, Exhibit 35 (Rec. 1096-97); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke, p.
20; Exhibit 7 (Rec. 1099); and Letter of Authorization attached as
an addendum hereto at Exhibit "A".
23.

Notwithstanding the restrictions on the Trustee's power

to conduct margin business, the letter authored by Defendant Pahnke
transferring the assets out of the Norman Anderson Trust purported
to put the assets into the Marital and Family Trust accounts but
actually

put them

into two separate margin

accounts.

See,

Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 28 (Rec. 1039); Depo. of Ralph
Pahnke (taken on July 21, 1988), p. 80 (Rec. 1123).
24.

Notwithstanding the reference in Mr. Pahnke's Letter of

Authorization that the assets being transferred out of the Norman
Anderson Trust were being transferred into the "Marital Trust" and
the "Family Trust", there was no attempt by Defendant Pahnke to
procure copies of either the Marital or Family Trust instruments
and have them reviewed by the Operations Center of Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. for approval for margin business. See, Affidavit of
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James E. Morton, Para. 29 (Rec. 1039); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke, p. 29
(Rec. 1124).
25.

The Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust was the largest

single customer Mr. Pahnke had ever represented. .See, Affidavit of
James E. Morton, Para. 30 (Rec. 1039-40); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke
(taken on June 29, 1988), p. 44 (Rec. 1125).
26.

In addition to an amendment to the trust agreement, it is

necessary to have the trustee sign a margin agreement to authorize
margin trading in a trust account.

See, Affidavit of James E.

Morton, Para. 31 (Rec. 1040); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke, p. 16 (Rec.
1126).
27.

Defendant Pahnke admitted to having forged the signature

of the Trustee on a margin agreement for the Anna Lee Anderson
Trust Account.

See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 32 (Rec.

1040); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke (taken on July 21, 1988), pp. 44-46
(Rec. 1127-29).
28. During the course of their relationship, Defendant Pahnke
demonstrated a willingness to lie for the benefit of the Trustee of
the Norman Anderson Trust, including representing to third party
lenders that all dividend income received in the trust accounts was
the personal income of the Trustee.

See, Affidavit of James E.

Morton, Para. 33 (Rec. 1040); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke, pp. 34-35
(Rec. 1130-31).
29.

The Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust never informed

Plaintiff of the transfer of assets out of the Norman Anderson
Trust until the time the present proceeding was commenced.
14

See,

Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 34 (Rec. 1040); Depo. of James
Norman Anderson, p. 468 (Rec. 1132).
30.

The Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust never informed

Plaintiff, the Beneficiary of the Norman Anderson Trust, of any
limitations on his authority to margin the assets in the Norman
Anderson Trust or that Norman Anderson had not signed an amendment
to his trust to permit margining.

See. Affidavit of James E.

Morton, Para. 35 (Rec. 1040); Depo. of James Norman Anderson, pp.
468-69 (Rec. 1133-34).
31.
informed

The Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust had always
Plaintiff

that

the

loss

of

the

assets

was

attributable to market conditions and a market crash.

solely
See,

Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 36 (Rec. 1040); Depo. of James
Norman Anderson, p. 469 (Rec. 1135).
32.

Plaintiff, Anna lee Anderson, did not discover that the

assets had been wrongfully transferred out of the Norman Anderson
Trust account or that the assets were wrongfully margined until
December, 1990, while being prepared to testify as a witness in an
arbitration hearing involving the Trustee, and Defendants Pahnke
and Dean Witter. See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 37 (Rec.
1040); Depo. of Anna Lee Anderson, p. 94-95 (Rec. 1136-37).
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VII.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The trial court erred in granting summary

judgment for

Defendants inasmuch as issues of material fact remain. Pursuant to
a Minute Entry, dated May 17, 1994, the trial court granted summary
judgment for Defendants pursuant to three specific findings, to
wit: Plaintiff's failure to establish Defendants' actual knowledge
of

the

contents of a trust established

for the benefit of

Plaintiff; Plaintiff's lack of standing; and the timeliness of
Plaintiff's claims under applicable statutes of limitation.

The

foregoing legal conclusions are erroneous, and should be reversed.
A.

THE TRANSACTION IN QUESTION VIOLATED THE EXPRESS TERMS OF
THE NORMAN ANDERSON TRUST, AND DEFENDANTS HAD ACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE SAME.

There is no dispute that the transaction which was facilitated
by Defendants on April 22, 1980 violated the express terms of the
Norman Anderson Trust.

The Trust required distribution into two

secondary trusts, to wit: the Marital Trust and the Family Trust.
The Letter of Authorization, drafted by Defendant

Pahnke on

Defendant Dean Witter letterhead, purports to transfer the assets
into the correct accounts but actually transfers the assets into
two independent margin accounts.
The Norman Anderson Trust did not authorize margin borrowing.
Consequently, the assets in the Trust could not be margined absent
an amendment from the Trustor, Norman Anderson.

Because the date

of the distribution was subsequent to Mr. Anderson's death, the
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Trust could not be amended and thus its assets could never be
margined.

In spite of this knowledge, and in contravention of

Defendants' own policies and procedures and industry standards,
Defendants placed the assets of the Norman Anderson Trust into
margin accounts and margined the same.

Thereafter, the assets in

the margin accounts were almost entirely depleted as the result of
a margin call.
B.

PLAINTIFF IS NOT REQUIRED TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANTS HAD
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE BREACH.

Pursuant to Otero v. Buslee, 695 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1982),
Defendants bear the burden of proving an affirmative defense, even
if it involves the assertion of a negative.

Id.

The defense of

statutory immunity due to a lack of actual knowledge under Utah
Code Ann.. §75-7-406 is a legal, affirmative defense which must be
asserted by Defendants in their Answer.

In addition, Defendants,

not Plaintiff, bear the burden of proving an affirmative defense.
Conseguently, as a matter of law, Plaintiff was not required to
prove Defendants had actual knowledge of the breach, and the trial
court's ruling to the contrary should be reversed.
1.

Defendant-^ Have Failed in Their Burden to Show
They Did Not Have Actual Knowledge of the
Breach.

Plaintiff has established that Defendants had actual
knowledge of a breach of the Trust at multiple levels.
Notwithstanding Dean Witter's review of the Norman Anderson Trust
and authorizing cash transactions only in the account, Defendants
permitted margin borrowing.

In so doing, Defendants violated

countless industry standards, Dean Witter policies and their own
17

mandate.
Concerning Defendants' contention that they owed no duty of
inquiry to the beneficiary pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §75-7-406,
Defendants have waived any potential benefit under the statute by
making actual inquiry.

Through securing a copy of the trust

instrument and reviewing its provisions, Defendants cannot now
contend that they were not obligated to inquire.
Finally, as set forth above, Defendants bear the burden of
proof relative in establishing that they did not have actual
knowledge of a breach.

As made clear by the case in which

Defendants place total reliance, Adler v. Manor Health Care
Corp.f 9 Cal Rptr 2d 732 (Cal.App. 1992), Defendants bear the
burden of producing evidence that they did not review the
relevant provisions of the Trust.
failed to do so.

Defendants have completely

The Trust was reviewed by at least three levels

of personnel within the Dean Witter organization.

Two of the

three departments cannot say which provisions were reviewed.
Consequently, Defendants have failed in their burden.
2.

Defendants' Have Waived Their Right to
Assert the Affirmative Defense of Statutory
Immunity Under Utah Code Ann., S78-7-406.

Defendants cannot assert lack of actual knowledge as a
defense in this case.

Defendants have failed to assert statutory

immunity, for lack of knowledge, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §787-406 as an affirmative defense.
waived as a matter of law.

Consequently, the defense is

See, Golding v. Ashley Cent.

Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 899 (Utah 1990); See alsor Rule 12, Utah
18

Rules of Civil Procedure.
3.

Defendants' Contention That a Review of the
Relevant Provisions of the Norman Anderson
Trust Would Not Have Made a Difference Is
Void of Merit.

Defendants argued to the trial court that a thorough review
of the Norman Anderson Trust would not have made a difference.
In their argument, they partially quoted language from the trust
agreement which, by substituting punctuation and not quoting the
entire sentence, was completely mischaracterized.

There is no

question that a thorough review of the Trust reveals that the
spouse of Norman Anderson, while living, was the sole beneficiary
of the Trust, and the Trustee was not allowed access to the Trust
funds for his own personal welfare.
C.

PLAINTIFF HAS STANDING TO BRING THIS LAWSUIT.

Defendants' contention that Plaintiff lacks standing flies
in the face of the express determination made by this Court
pursuant to a prior appeal.

See, Anderson v. Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc. et al, 841 P.2d 742 (Utah App. 1992).

The

Restatement (Second) of Trusts clearly provides that a
beneficiary of a Trust may bring an action against a third party
for breach of trust under the following circumstances:
(2) If the trustee improperly refuses or neglects to bring
an action against the third person, the beneficiary can
maintain a suit in equity against the trustee and the third
person.
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §282 (1976).

In addition,

Section 327 of the Restatement provides:
(2) If the third person knowingly participated in a breach
of trust, the beneficiary is not precluded from maintaining
19

an action against him therefore, unless:
(a) The beneficiary is himself guilty of laches . • .
Restatement (Second^ of Trusts, §327 (1976)-

Based upon the

foregoing, this Court concluded that Plaintiff had standing to
bring this suit, inasmuch as the Trustee had waited over ten
years to initiate an action against Defendants.

The trial

court's grant of summary judgment on this issue should be
reversed.
D.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WERE CONCEALED FROM HER BY DEFENDANTS
AND ARE THEREFORE NOT BARRED BY APPLICABLE STATUTES OF
LIMITATION.

Defendants have not adduced any evidence that would suggest
that Plaintiff discovered, prior to December, 1990, the breaches
which had occurred in her deceased husband's trust account.
Several professionals, consisting of accountants and lawyers, had
a great deal more information than Plaintiff, not to mention
sophistication, and never discovered the breaches.

The one piece

of evidence that these individuals lacked was the Letter of
Authorization written by Mr. Pahnke. Without that letter, it was
literally impossible to determine what had happened in the
accounts and the losses which were sustained therein appeared to
be attributable to nothing other than the legitimate exercise of
the Trustee's authority and market conditions.
1.

Plaintiffrs Claims Are Preserved Under the
Discovery Rule.

It is well established that "a cause of action does not
accrue and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until
the plaintiff learns of or in the exercise of reasonable
20

diligence should have learned of the facts which give rise to the
cause of action-"
1990).

Klinger v. Rightly, 792 P.2d 868, 879 (Utah

In the present action, Plaintiff did not discover her

claims against Defendants until December 1990. Plaintiff was
unable to discover her claims prior to this time inasmuch as
Defendants concealed the same from her.
Despite their obligation to deal with the Trustee,
Defendants regularly dealt with Plaintiff in this case.
Notwithstanding their knowledge that the breaches had occurred
within the Norman Anderson Trust, they never disclosed the same.
They had an affirmative duty to do so.

See, Centerre Bank of

Independence v. Bliss. 765 S.W.2d 276 (Mo.App. 1988).
Further, a trust relationship limits the duty of inquiry
into the existence of a cause of action which would otherwise
commence the running of a statute of limitation.

See, Eisenbaum

v. Western Energy Resources, Inc., 267 Cal.Rptr. 5 (Cal.App.
1990).

As in Eisenbaum, Plaintiff did not learn of the existence

of a claim in this case until all of the pieces of the puzzle
were put together including a review of the distributive
provisions of the Norman Anderson Trust, the industry standards
governing margining of accounts and the Letter of Authorization
drafted by Defendant Pahnke coupled with the technical expertise
of an attorney.

Without that combination of events, Plaintiff

would have had no way of knowing she had a claim and certainly
would not have had a duty to inquire based upon the limited
information to which she had access.
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Plaintifffs Claims Are Preserved Under
Section 327 of the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts.

2.

The law governing Plaintiff's claims, within the context of
the statute of limitations, is set forth in §327 of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts which provides in relevant part:
(2) If the third person knowingly participated in a
breach of trust, the beneficiary is not precluded from
maintaining an action against him therefore, unless:
(a) The beneficiary is himself guilty of laches, or;
(b) A co-trustee who did not participate in the breach
of trust, or a successor trustee knowing of the claim
against the third person, fails to bring an action
against him until he is barred by the statute of
limitations or by laches.
The comment on Section (2) of the Restatement (Second) of Trustsr
§327 similarly provides:
If a third person knowingly participates in the
breach of trust, the beneficiary is not barred from
maintaining a suit against him merely because the
trustee is barred. The beneficiary will be barred if,
but only if, he is himself guilty of laches. Thus, the
beneficiary will not be barred if he is under an
incapacity or ordinarily if he did not know of the
breach of trust.
Id. at 127-128.
In the present case, there is absolutely no evidence that
Plaintiff knew of the breach of trust prior to December, 1990,
the time the Complaint was filed.

Consequently, under the

Restatement, Plaintiff's claims are not barred by the applicable
statutes of limitation.
3,

Plaintiff is Not Guilty of Laches.

The establishment of laches requires two elements:

lack of

diligence on the part of Plaintiff and injury to Defendant owing
22

to such lack of diligence.
1980).

Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah

Plaintiff initiated her claim within one week of

discovering it.

Moreover, Defendants have not shown any "injury"

as a result of any alleged lack of diligence on the part of
Plaintiff.

Consequently, Plaintiff's claims are not barred by

applicable statutes of limitation.
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VII.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that a party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

In the present

case, the trial court incorrectly concluded that Defendants were
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on three separate
grounds, to wit:

Plaintiff's failure to show "actual knowledge"

on the part of Defendants; Plaintiff's lack of standing; and the
timeliness of Plaintiff's claims under applicable statutes of
limitation.
The entry of summary judgment on these issues was in error.
As a matter of law, Plaintiff is not required to show "actual
knowledge" on the part of the Defendants.

Nevertheless, the

facts in this case clearly establish actual knowledge on the part
of the Defendants or, at the very least, create a material issue
of fact thereby precluding summary judgment.
Similarly, the trial court incorrectly concluded, for the
second time, that Plaintiff lacked standing.

This Court

previously reversed the trial court on this identical issue,
finding that Plaintiff did indeed have standing to bring this
suit.
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Finally, the trial court incorrectly concluded that
Plaintiff's claims were barred by statutes of limitation.

As a

matter of law, the statute does not commence running against a
beneficiary under these circumstances unless there is actual
discovery of the claim.

There is no evidence to establish that

Plaintiff discovered the claim until days prior to its filing.
Further, notwithstanding their duty to affirmatively disclose the
violations to Plaintiff, Defendants sat mute.

They, along with

the Trustee, concealed the claim from Plaintiff.

The claim was

so well concealed that accountants and attorneys who had far more
information and sophistication than Plaintiff did not determine
that there had been a violation of the Norman Anderson Trust
Agreement.

Given Defendants' relationship with both the Trustee

and Beneficiary, the duty of Plaintiff to inquire was limited as
a matter of law.

Consequently, Plaintiff's claim is not barred

by statutes of limitation.
A.

THE TRANSACTION IN QUESTION VIOLATED THE EXPRESS TERMS
OF THE NORMAN ANDERSON TRUST, AND DEFENDANTS HAD ACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE SAME.
This case turns on the propriety of a single, isolated

transaction which occurred in April, 1980. The transaction in
question involved the wrongful transfer of all of the assets out
of the Norman Anderson Trust into two independent margin
accounts, including the personal account of the Trustee.

The

transfer violated the express terms of the Norman Anderson Trust
Agreement and was facilitated by both the Trustee of the Norman
Anderson Trust, and Ralph Pahnke, a stockbroker employed by Dean
25

Witter Reynolds, Inc.

Given the obvious culpability of the

Trustee and stockbroker, the claim was never pursued by the
Trustee and was not discovered by the Beneficiary until days
prior to the filing of the present action.
There is no dispute that Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter
received a complete copy of the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement
prior to the transfer in question. (Rec. 1036; 1048-49).

There

is also no dispute that the entire trust agreement was forwarded
to the Regional Operations Center of Dean Witter in San
Francisco, California for review and approval. (Rec. 1036; 105051).

Following that review, the Operations Center approved the

trust account for a "cash account only". (Rec. 1037, 1061, 1066).
By definition, a cash account means that the account may not be
margined without further approval. (Rec. 1038; 1085-87).
Pursuant to Dean Witter policy and governing law, the
margining of assets in the account could not have been approved
except through an amendment to the trust by the Trustor, Norman
Anderson. (Rec. 1037; 1072-74).

At the time the assets were

transferred, Norman Anderson had been dead for approximately six
weeks.

Consequently, he could not have amended the trust

instrument and any power to authorize the margining of assets
within the trust died with Mr. Anderson.
The Norman Anderson Trust Agreement is clear with respect to
the distribution plan of the trust upon the occurrence of the
death of the Trustor, Norman Anderson.

Following Mr. Anderson's

death, the assets owned by the trust were to be distributed into
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two separate trusts known as the Marital Trust and Family Trust.
The Marital and Family Trusts are created within the Norman
Anderson Trust document.

The Trustee of the Norman Anderson

Trust is also designated Trustee of the Marital and Family
trusts.

The powers of the Trustee are also identical with

respect to all three trusts.
business.

There is no provision for margin

(Rec. 1039; 1100-1122).

Instead of transferring the assets of the Norman Anderson
Trust into the Martial and Family Trusts as required by the
Norman Anderson Trust Agreement, the assets were actually
transferred into two separate margin accounts including an
account for the sole, personal benefit of the Trustee, James N.
Anderson. (Rec. 1039 and 1123).

The text of the Letter of

Authorization which facilitated the transfer of assets out of the
Norman Anderson Trust and into the two margin accounts is
entirely in the handwriting of Defendant, Ralph Pahnke1. (Rec.
1039; 1096-97; 1099).

It is on Dean Witter letterhead.

Certainly, it cannot be disputed that Dean Witter participated in
the breach of the Trust Agreement. (See: Exhibit "A" to the
Addendum attached hereto).
There is no question that the transfer which took place
pursuant to Defendant Pahnkefs Letter of Authorization violated
the express terms of the Norman Anderson Trust.

The Letter of

Authorization purported to place the assets into accounts which

1

A true and accurate copy of the "Letter of Authorization"
is attached as an addendum hereto at Exhibit "A".
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were denominated as the "Marital Trust" and "Family Trust" but
actually placed the assets into unrelated margin accounts.
Notwithstanding the reguirement that Dean Witter obtain a
complete copy of the trust agreement from the Trustee and have
the agreement scrutinized by the Operations Center prior to
approving margin business, Mr. Pahnke circumvented all of these
procedural requirements by simply maintaining the accounts in
other names.

(Rec. 1039; 1123-24).

Mr. Pahnke literally violated every relevant procedure of
Dean Witter in order to facilitate access to funds for what
proved to be his largest client ever.
a.

Consider the following:

Dean Witter policy mandates that trust accounts will be

approved on a cash basis only unless the trust instrument
specifically authorizes the trustee to margin the assets therein.
(Rec. 1038; 1072-82).

Mr. Pahnke knew the Norman Anderson Trust

was approved for a cash account only.

In addition, he made no

attempt to have the Marital and Family Trusts reviewed by the
Operations Center to determine whether they were eligible for
margin business; (Rec. 1039, 1124).
b.

Mr. Pahnke knew that it was necessary to amend a trust

agreement if it did not expressly provide for margin business.
This policy was included in Mr. Pahnke's Account Executive Policy
Manual.

Mr. Pahnke also knew the Trustor was dead and amendment

of the Trust was thus unavailable; and
c.

Dean Witter policy provides that if an existing account

is conducting margin business, it will not transfer or "journal"
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the assets in that account to a new trust account unless the
Operations Center has approved the trust document in the
transferee account for margin business. Moreover, it is
incumbent upon the Account Executive to secure a copy of the
trust document for review before any such transfer is made.
(Rec. 1038; 1081-82).

Notwithstanding Mr. Pahnke's handwritten

Letter of Authorization purportedly transferring the assets in
the Norman Anderson Trust to the "Marital Trust" and "Family
Trust", he made no attempt to secure copies of the trust
instruments from the Trustee or have them reviewed by the Dean
Witter Regional Operations Center. (Rec. 1039, 1124).
The losses which were sustained by the Norman Anderson Trust
were the result of a margin call.

Obviously, had the wrongful

transfer to margin accounts not occurred, the losses would not
have been sustained.
It is well-established that a third party who participated
with a fiduciary in a breach of his duty to the beneficiary is
liable to the beneficiary.
§326 (1976).

See, Restatement (Second) Trustsf

See also, Seminole Nation v. United States, 316

U.S. 286 (1942).

More specifically, " . . . one who, even

without breaching any duty owed on his own behalf, aids a trustee
in breaching the fiduciary duty . . . may be held liable as a de
facto trustee even if he does not benefit from the breach."2
2

facto"
didn't
Pahnke
off of

Notwithstanding the fact that Defendants acted as "de
trustees and can therefore be held liable even if they
benefit from the breach, it should be noted that Defendant
made more in commissions off of these margin accounts than
any other customer in his career and Dean Witter made in
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Wisconsin Real Estate Investment Trust v. Weinstein, 509 F.Supp.
1289, 1300 (E.D. Wis. 1981).

See also, U.S. v. Rivieccio, 661

F.Supp. 281, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).

It is abundantly clear that

Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter knowingly participated with the
Trustee in the breach of the Norman Anderson Trust and, in so
doing, damaged the Beneficiary.
Notwithstanding all of the policies governing the review and
approval of trust accounts and the specific requirement that
trust accounts be amended before margin business is conducted if
express authority to margin is not conferred upon the Trustee,
Dean Witter permitted margin borrowing by the Trustee in the
Norman Anderson Trust account itself and later permitted the
transfer of the assets in the account into two independent margin
accounts. (Rec. 1039; 1088 and 1123).

Defendants claim all of

this was accomplished without the benefit of further review,
approval and amendment as required by Dean Witter's own policies
and procedures.
In spite of the foregoing, Dean Witter has taken the
incredible position that it is entitled to immunity from
liability for its participation in the breach of trust because of
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §75-7-406 which provide:
With respect to a third person dealing with a trustee or
assisting a trustee in the conduct of a transaction, the
existence of trust power and the proper exercise by the
trustee may be assumed without inquiry. The third person is
not bound to inquire whether the trustee has power to act or
is properly exercising the power; and a third person,
without actual knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his
excess of one million dollars in margin interest.
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power or improperly exercising themf is fully protected in
the dealings with the trustee as if the trustee possessed
and properly exercised the powers he purports to exercise.
A third person is not bound to assure the proper application
of trust assets paid or delivered to the trustee.
(emphasis added).
Defendants' position is seriously flawed for a variety of
reasons.

The statute in question immunizes third persons from a

"duty of inquiry" which, under the common law, attached to third
persons who dealt with a trustee.

While the statute may relieve

a third person of the obligation to inquire, it is undisputed
that Defendants did inquire.
instrument.
business.

They requested the trust

They reviewed it.

They approved it for restricted

Thereafter, they violated it.

It is a well-established principle that one who volunteers
to act, although under no duty to do so, is thereafter charged
with the duty to act reasonably and is liable for damages for
injury resulting from the breach of that duty.

See, Rudolph v.

First Southern Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. 414 S.2d 64, 67
(Ala. 1982).

In Rudolph, homeowners entered into an agreement

with a contractor for the purpose of constructing improvements to
their home.

When First Southern agreed to finance the

improvements, it employed an inspector who would periodically
inspect the progress of the construction prior to satisfying a
draw request from the contractor.

As in this case, the lender

testified that the inspections were for its sole benefit to
enable it to determine whether sufficient improvements had been
constructed to constitute [security] for its construction loan.
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The contractor defaulted on the construction contract and failed
to pay various materialmen and subcontractors.

Notwithstanding

the complete absence of a duty to inspect and approve the
construction, the Alabama Supreme Court found that the lender had
assumed a duty through its voluntary undertaking.

Id. at 65-67.

In the present case, Dean Witter may very well have
insulated itself from liability had it not undertook to inquire
concerning the limitations of authority of the Trustee of the
Norman Anderson Trust.

However, it did inquire.

As a

consequence thereof, it may not seek refuge in the provisions of
Utah Code Ann.r §75-7-406, nor may it claim it did not have
actual knowledge of the breach.

Based on the foregoing, factual

disputes preclude entry of summary judgment in Defendants' favor
on the issue of "actual knowledge".
B.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFF IS NOT REQUIRED TO SHOW
THAT DEFENDANTS HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE BREACH.

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the
grounds that Plaintiff failed to show Defendants had actual
knowledge of the breach.

Notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff

can establish actual knowledge on Defendants' part as set forth
above, as a matter of law, Plaintiff is not required to do so.
It is universally recognized that Defendants have the burden of
proof with respect to their affirmative defenses.

See, Empire

State Building Co. v. Bryde, 318 N.W.2d 65 (Neb. 1982).

See

also. Otero v. Busleef 695 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1982);
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. T.J.J.R. Inc., 548 A.2d 390
(Pa. 1988); Pace v. Hymas, 726 P.2d 693 (Idaho 1986).
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In Otero,

the Tenth Circuit held that the Defendant bears the burden of
proving an affirmative defense, even if he must assert a
negative.

This, of course, has particular significance to this

case because of Dean Witter's claimed entitlement to statutory
immunity and its suggestion that it did not have "actual
knowledge" of the relevant provisions of the Norman Anderson
Trust.

These defenses are affirmative defenses which must be

asserted by Defendants in their answer.

Consequently, the burden

is upon Defendants to show they did not have "actual knowledge".
Plaintiff was not legally required to show Defendants had actual
knowledge, as was determined by the Trial Court.
1-

Defendants Have Failed in Their Burden to
Show They Did Not Have Actual Knowledge of a
Breach.

Defendants have failed in their burden to show they did not
have actual knowledge of the breach.

Defendants acknowledge

their obligation to follow the instructions of the Trustee unless
they have actual knowledge of a violation of the Trust Agreement.
From the commencement of this action, Plaintiff has contended
that Defendants were aware of a breach of the Trust in several
particulars.

Her contentions are substantiated by both the

evidence and the law.

First, there is no dispute that Defendants

had actual knowledge that the assets in the Norman Anderson Trust
could not be margined.

Their policies, rather than internal

administrative guidelines, reflect industry standards, as
confirmed by their own experts and the specific language of the
policies.
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The standard in the industry was to review and approve every
trust instrument for margin business. (Rec. 1038; 1079-80).

If

the trust did not specifically authorize margin trading, it would
either have to be amended or, at the very least, permission would
have to be given by the trustor to permit this speculative
practice. (Rec. 1037; 1072-74).

Defendants originally reviewed

the Norman Anderson Trust and approved if for cash business only.
(Rec. 1038; 1085-87).

Thereafter, when the assets of the Trust

were purportedly distributed into the Marital and Family Trusts,
there was no attempt to determine whether these secondary trusts
were eligible for margin business, nor was there any attempt to
resubmit the Norman Anderson Trust for approval for margin
business.3 (Rec. 1039, 1124).

Defendants knew that the Norman

Anderson Trust had not been approved for margin business.
However, without regard to the mandates contained in the Trust or
their own policies and industry standards, they margined the
assets anyway. (Rec. 1039, 1088).

Without question, Defendants

knew that without first seeking the authorization of the Trustor,
they had breached the Trust.
Second, as previously discussed, Defendants' contention that
they had no duty of inquiry due to the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated, §75-7-406, is equally void of merit.

It is inherently

inconsistent to say on the one hand that Defendants have no duty

J

It is clear that had the Trust been submitted for margin
approval it would not have been approved.
The Trust did not
specifically provide for margin business, nor could it have been
amended as the Trustor, Norman Anderson, had died.
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of inquiry and, on the other, that they can actually make inquiry
and still enjoy third party immunity under the statute.

The

facts in this case are absolutely beyond dispute that Defendants
procured a complete copy of the Norman Anderson Trust, reviewed
it, and based upon that review, limited the kind of business that
could be done in the Trust Account.

Thereafter, they violated

their own self-imposed restriction by permitting the assets in
the Trust to be margined.

There is simply no immunity under

these circumstances.
Finally, and certainly no less compelling than the other
grounds stated hereinabove, is that Defendants have the burden of
proof relative to establishing that they did not have actual
knowledge.

See, Otero, supra.

Defendants place complete

reliance upon Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 732
(Cal.App. 1992).

Their reliance is misplaced.

Adler, stands for

the precise proposition urged by Plaintiff, to wit:

That the

burden is upon Defendants to establish that they did not have
actual knowledge.

Consider the language of the Adler Court:

Manor submitted the declarations of several employees of
both Manor and its agent, First American, who had been
directly involved in the subject transaction. In each case,
these individuals affirmed that they had no knowledge
whatsoever of any alleged lack of authority on the part of
Golden Rain to make the conveyance.
Id. at 737.

(Emphasis added).

In the present case, Defendants have failed to produce
competent evidence that the Operations Center of Dean Witter or
its Compliance Department did not review the relevant provisions
of the Norman Anderson Trust.

With respect to the Operations
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Center, the individual who reviewed the Trust, Kathy Barnett,
states that she has no memory of having reviewed the Trust. (Rec.
1037; 1052-53).

She cannot state unequivocally that she did not

review the provisions in question. (Rec. 1037; 1052-58).
With respect to the Compliance Department, Defendants have a
problem of even greater proportion.

Defendants know that the

document was requested by the Compliance Department for review.
(Rec. 1039; 1089-93).

They don't know why. (Rec. 1039; 1089-93).

Despite Defendants' creative attempts to mischaracterize their
own witnesses' testimony, it is clear that the Compliance
Department review was not for the purpose of authorizing margin
business.4

Consequently, Dean Witter's attempt to claim that it

did not review the distribution provisions of the Trust fall
short of the mark.

Under any of the three scenarios set forth

above, Dean Witter had actual knowledge of the breach.
Consequently, it may not seek refuge in this defense, and it was
not entitled to summary judgment in its favor.
2.

Defendants' Have Waived Their Right to Assert
the Affirmative Defense of Statutory Immunity
Under Utah Code Ann.r S75-7-406.

Assuming arguendo that Defendants could show they were
4

Given the proximity in time to the wrongful margin business
that was being conducted in the Norman Anderson Trust during the
summer months of 1979, shortly following the Trustor's death, and
the date the Compliance Department requested a copy of the trust
document (August, 1979), it is probable that the Compliance
Department sought to determine the propriety of the Trustee
conducting margin business.
The transfer of assets into
established margin accounts thereafter eliminated the appearance of
a problem. Defendants cannot locate any documentation of what went
on within the Compliance Department after the document was
forwarded to the Department by the Operations Center.
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statutorily immune as a result of having no actual knowledge of
the breach, they waived their right to assert the same as an
affirmative defense.

It is well-established that if an

affirmative defense is not asserted, it is waived.

See, Golding

v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co.. 793 P.2d 897 (Utah 1990).

The

defense of statutory immunity is clearly a legal or affirmative
defense and must be asserted in the Answer.

In the present case,

Defendants failed to plead statutory immunity under Utah Code
Annotated §75-7-406 as an affirmative defense.
has been waived.
3.

Consequently, it

See, Rule 12, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Defendants' Contention That a Review of the
Relevant Provisions of the Norman Anderson Trust
Would Not Have Made a Differenge Is Void of
Merit,

Defendants, after desperately attempting to disclaim any
knowledge of the contents of a document which was reviewed by
three levels of personnel within its organization, next claim
that even if they had reviewed the document, it would have made
no

difference.

In order to make the argument, Defendants

mischaracterized certain provisions of the Norman Anderson Trust
by only partially guoting the referenced sections or referring
the trial court to portions of the document which have no
relevance to the transaction in question.

For example,

Defendants attempted to quote a portion of Section 3.3.IB of the
Marital Trust by stating that the Trust allowed payment of
Marital Trust Funds for "Trustor's wife and familyf and for funds
to enable the purchase of residences". (Emphasis added by
Defendants).

It is remarkable that Defendants would change the
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punctuation in the quote and not include the remainder of the
clause in Section 3.3.IB which states: ". . . and for funds to
enable the purchase of residences, the Trustee, at any time and
from time to time, may in his sole discretion pay or distribute
to Trustorfs wife so much of the principal of the Trust as he
shall deem necessary or advisable under the circumstances".
(Emphasis added). (Rec. 1100-1122).
The mere fact that Defendants referred the trial court to
dispositive provisions of the Marital Trust instead of the Norman
Anderson Trust underscores the weakness of their position.

This

transaction is concerned solely with the disposition of the
Norman Anderson Trust.

The dispositive provision of the Norman

Anderson Trust states:
3.2.2. Wife Surviving. If Trustor's wife does survive
Trustor, the Trustee shall divide the trust estate,
including all assets distributable to the Trust by
reason of the death of Trustor, into two separate
trusts, the first to be called the "Marital Trust" and
the second the "Family Trust" to be administered as
provided in 3.3 and 3.4.
Norman Anderson Trust, §3.2.2. (Emphasis added). (Rec. 11001122).
In addition to their obvious attempt to distort the language
of the Trust, Defendants also overlook the fact that the Letter
of Authorization authored by Defendant Pahnke on April 22, 1980
was really no more than a ruse.

Notwithstanding the language in

the letter, which created the appearance of complying with the
dispositive provision of the Norman Anderson Trust, the assets
were actually routed into entirely unrelated accounts which set
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the stage for self-dealing and the ultimate loss of a substantial
amount of equity in the accounts.

See: Letter of Authorization,

attached as an addendum at Exhibit "A".
C.

PLAINTIFF HAS STANDING TO BRING THIS LAWSUIT.
1.

This Court Already Determined that Anna Lee
Anderson Has Standing to Bring This Suit.

Defendants' contention that Plaintiff lacks standing is
simply wrong.

This issue, along with the statute of limitations,

has already been developed in the prior appeal of this case and
has been resolved in favor of Plaintiff.

See, Anderson v. Dean

Witter Reynolds. Inc., et al., 841 P.2d 742 (Utah App. 1992).

In

Anderson, this Court held:
In the present situation, it is clear from the complaint the
beneficiary could prove facts showing she had standing to
bring suit against the third parties for the improper
distribution of stock. She could show, at the very least,
the Trustee improperly "neglected" to bring action against
the appellees when he waited over ten years after the
improper transfer and still did not bring suit.
Id. at 745.

(Emphasis added).

The only inquiry relevant to the standing issue was whether
the Trustee had neglected to file a lawsuit within ten years of
the improper transfer.

Notwithstanding Defendants' protestations

to the contrary, Plaintiff has no obligation under the Anderson
decision to demonstrate hostility between the Trustee and
beneficiary.

Consequently, Plaintiff's right to bring this

lawsuit is irrefutable, and the Trial Court's ruling to the
contrary must be reversed.
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2.

Anna Lee Anderson, as Beneficiary of the Norman
Anderson Trust, is the Proper Party to Bring
Suit in This Case,

While it is a generally accepted principle that
beneficiaries of a trust cannot maintain an action against third
parties who have acted adversely to the trust, there are
exceptions to this rule which apply in the present case.

Section

282 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts provides in relevant
part:
. . .

(2) If the trustee improperly refuses or neglects to
bring an action against the third person, the
beneficiary can maintain a suit in eguity against the
trustee and the third person.
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §282 (1976).

In addition,

Section 327 of the Restatement provides
(2) If the third person knowingly participated
in a breach of trust, the beneficiary is not
precluded from maintaining an action against
him therefore, unless:
(a) The beneficiary is himself guilty of laches . . .
As set forth in the preceding section, this Court found these
provisions directly on point and concluded that under the
circumstances of this case, Anna Lee Anderson was entitled to
maintain the present suit.
D.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WERE CONCEALED FROM HER BY DEFENDANTS
AND ARE THEREFORE NOT BARRED BY APPLICABLE STATUTES OF
LIMITATION.

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on
the statute of limitations.

Plaintiffs claims are not barred by

the statute of limitations and are preserved under three separate
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legal theories set forth below.
1.

Plaintiff's Claims Are Preserved Under the
Discovery Rule,

It is well established that "a cause of action does not
accrue and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until
the plaintiff learns of or in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have learned of the facts which give rise to the
cause of action."
1990).

Klinger v. Rightly, 792 P.2d 868, 869 (Utah

In the present action, Plaintiff did not discover her

claim against Defendants until December 1990. (Rec. 1040; 113637).

Plaintiff was unable to discover her claim prior to this

time inasmuch as Defendants concealed the same from her.
There is no dispute in this case that in addition to dealing
with the Trustee, the beneficiary also dealt directly with
Defendant Pahnke.

Notwithstanding those relationships, neither

the Trustee nor Defendants disclosed to Plaintiff that a breach
of trust had occurred.

It is universal that when a party stands

in a fiduciary relationship or otherwise possesses superior
knowledge of a condition, there exists a duty to affirmatively
disclose material facts. £e£, Centerre Bank of Independence v.
Bliss, 765 SW.2d 276 (Mo.App. 1988).

See alsor Shea v. H.S.

Pickrell Company, Inc., 748 P.2d 980 (N.M.App. 1987) (Duty on
part of lender if one party to the transaction has superior
knowledge not possessed by the other party or has knowledge that
the other party is acting under a mistaken belief as to a
material fact).
In the present case, both the Trustee and Dean Witter were
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aware of the Letter of Authorization which facilitated the
improper transfer.

The transfer placed the assets in margin

accounts where they were not supposed to be.

None of this was

disclosed to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff was obviously laboring
under the mistaken belief that what was happening was entirely
legitimate.

Given the undisputed fact that Plaintiff dealt

directly with Defendants during the period surrounding the
breach, Defendants' argument that it cannot be tied to the
concealment of the Trustee is also without merit.

Given

Defendants' direct participation in the breach of trust, their
duty to disclose material facts to the beneficiary was no
different than that of the Trustee.
It is well-recognized that a trust relationship limits the
duty of inquiry into the existence of a cause of action which
would otherwise commence the running of the statute of
limitations.

See, Eisenbaum v. Western Energy Resourcesr Inc.r

267 Cal.Rep. 5 (Cal.App. 1990).

In Eisenbaumf the buyer of a

limited partnership interest in an oil and gas venture was
entitled to rely upon his assumption that the general partners in
the venture had told him the truth about the legality of the
transaction.

Consequently, the statute of limitations did not

commence to run on an action for rescission until such time as
the purchaser received advice from his attorney that the sale of
the limited partnership interest was illegal.
5

Defendants' compliance expert, Allan Rockier, has testified
that computer technology employed by Dean Witter would have alerted
the brokerage to the improper margin activity. (Rec. 1420).
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The facts of the present case are similar to Eisenbaum in
that Plaintiff first learned of the illegality of the subject
transaction through counsel.

Plaintiff, an elderly high school

graduate, was hardly capable of evaluating the legality of this
transaction without access to critical information such as the
Letter of Authorization.6

As indicated above, even greater

luminaries such as accountants and lawyers never even suspected
any impropriety in connection with the transaction.
Consequently, Defendants' suggestion that Plaintiff somehow had a
duty to make a more extraordinary inquiry is unfounded.
2.

Plaintiff'e Claims Are Preserved Under Section
327 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts,

The law governing Plaintiff's claims, within the context of

0

The account statements for the two margin accounts in
question were sent directly to the Trustee, who did not provide
copies of the same to the Beneficiary. Similarly, the Beneficiary
was never provided a copy of the Letter of Authorization which
transferred the trust funds into the margin accounts. These facts
are significant as the account statements and the Letter of
Authorization are the only tangible evidence that the assets of the
Norman Anderson Trust were transferred into the wrong accounts.
The Letter of Authorization identifies the numbered accounts into
which the assets of the Norman Anderson Trust were actually placed.
The numbered accounts were, in reality, unrelated margin accounts,
not the Marital or Family Trust accounts. Similarly, the account
statements identify the margin accounts into which the trust funds
were placed.
Without the Letter of Authorization and/or the
account statements, the beneficiary could not possibly have known
that the trust funds were placed in the wrong accounts.
7

Defendants' reliance upon Leggroan v. Zions Savings Bankf
232 P.2d 746 (Utah 1951) is misplaced. Leggroan deals with the
issue of notice, for the purpose of the commencement of
limitations, beginning to run when the trustee retains property in
the trust after final distribution. It is undisputed that the 1984
margin calls did not eliminate the entire equity from these
accounts. Even following the calls, there existed a cash balance
in the accounts. The trust remained active thereafter.
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the statute of limitations, is set forth in §327 of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts which provides in relevant part:
(2) If the third person knowingly participated in a
breach of trust, the beneficiary is not precluded from
maintaining an action against him therefore, unless:
(a) The beneficiary is himself guilty of laches, or;
(b) A co-trustee who did not participate in the breach
of trust, or a successor trustee knowing of the claim
against the third person, fails to bring an action
against him until he is barred by the statute of
limitations or by laches.
The comment on Section (2) of the Restatement I Second) of Trustsf
§327 similarly provides:
If a third person knowingly participates in the
breach of trust, the beneficiary is not barred from
maintaining a suit against him merely because the
trustee is barred. The beneficiary will be barred if,
but only if, he is himself guilty of laches. Thus, the
beneficiary will not be barred if he is under an
incapacity or ordinarily if he did not know of the
breach of trust.
Id. at 127-128.
In the present case, there is absolutely no evidence that
Plaintiff knew of the breach of trust prior to December, 1990,
the time the Complaint was filed.

In fact, it is clear from the

evidence that the Trustee was well aware of the fact that the
express terms of the trust had been violated and concealed that
from the Beneficiary by simply informing her that the losses were
the result of market conditions. (Rec. 1040; 1132-35).
Dean Witter knowingly participated with the Trustee in the
breach of the trust.

It had secured a complete copy of the trust

instrument from the Trustee. (Rec. 1036; 1048-49).

Its employee,

Ralph Pahnke, handwrote the Letter of Authorization on Dean
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Witter letterhead transferring all of the assets out of the Trust
in violation of the Trust Agreement. (Rec. 1039; 1096-97; 1099
and Exhibit "A"). The assets were transferred into margin
accounts in violation of Dean Witter policy and the common law8
after the Regional Operations Center of Dean Witter had informed
the Salt Lake City branch that the Norman Anderson Trust Account
could be administered on a cash account basis only. (Rec. 1038;
1085-87 and 1123).

To deny a knowing participation in the breach

of trust by Dean Witter required the undisputed facts in this
proceeding to be ignored.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff's alleged knowledge of a
margin account coupled with knowledge of losses sustained in a
margin call commenced the running of the statute of limitations.
Defendants completely miss the point.

The issue surrounding

Plaintiff's discovery of her claim involved learning that the
assets of the Norman Anderson Trust had actually been placed in
the wrong accounts and that the accounts were improperly
margined.

She had no way of acquiring that information.

She did

not receive statements from Dean Witter on any of these accounts.
Notwithstanding her interaction with the Trustee and Defendant
Pahnke, both of whom knew of the breach of trust, she was not
informed.

Consequently, Plaintiff was left to believe that the

losses which had occurred in the account were no more than the

b

See, Merrill, Lynch, Pierce & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247
F.Supp. 373 (S.D. Texas 1965); In re Shaner Estatef 26 D&C 2d 450
(Pa. 1961).
See also, Scott, Trusts, §227.6 Vol. Ill, p. 444
(1988); Loring, A Trustee's Handbook, §55 at 156 (5th Ed. 1940).
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result of the legitimate exercise of powers of the Trustee
(margin activity) and market conditions (the decline in value of
securities owned by the Trust).
Perhaps the most compelling evidence of Plaintiff's
legitimate non-discovery of the breach involves the many
professionals with whom the Trustee did business.

The Trustee

employed certified public accountants and attorneys to deal with
issues concerning the trust accounts and his individual account.
These professionals had a great deal more information than
Plaintiff ever had.

They had access to account statements,

information provided by Defendant Pahnke from Dean Witter and
other source documentation, including the relevant trust
documents.

They understood the distribution provisions in the

Norman Anderson Trust.

Yet not one of these professionals ever

suspected that there had been a breach of the Norman Anderson
Trust Agreement.

They have testified that they would have

alerted Plaintiff had they known. (Rec. 1354-1357; 1463-1495).
Given the information to which they had access, coupled with
their sophistication, how is it that a 71 year old woman with a
high school education and no information was supposed to have
discovered the breach when these professionals could not.
The one, single piece of information that each of these
individuals, including Plaintiff, was lacking, was the Letter of
Authorization authored by Mr. Pahnke.

The Letter of

Authorization unlocks the mysteries concerning how the breach of
trust was accomplished.

Without it, the losses appeared to have
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been entirely legitimate.
It is absolutely clear that under Section 327 of the
Restatement (Second1 of Trusts, the beneficiary is not barred by
the statute of limitations "if [she] did not know of the breach
of trust."

See, Comment to §327 (2). In the present case,

Defendants, despite having taken the deposition of everyone who
had even the most peripheral contact with this case, have failed
to adduce evidence that Plaintiff knew of the breach prior to
December 1990.

Consequently, their statute of limitations

defense necessarily fails.
3.

Plaintiff is Not Guilty of Laches,

The beneficiary is certainly not guilty of laches. Within
several days of discovering the breach of trust, she immediately
caused the Complaint in the present action to be filed.
no evidence to the contrary.

There is

Moreover, it is clear that the mere

passage of time is not enough to invoke the doctrine of laches.
See, Gillespie v. Seymour, 823 P.2d 782 (Kan. 1991) (failure of
co-trustee to bring action arising out of alleged misapplication
of trust's oil and gas investment could not be utilized to bar,
under doctrine of laches, beneficiaries from bringing action;
beneficiaries moved promptly to bring action upon learning of the
facts).

See also. Matter of Trust Created by Belgard v. Johnson,

829 P.2d 457 (Colo.App. 1991) (remainderman's cause of action for
breach of trust accrued when breach of trust was discovered);
Skok v. Snyder, 733 P.2d 547 (Wash.App. 1987) (in order to set
statute of limitations in motion against beneficiary, trustee's
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repudiation of express trust must be plain, strong and
unequivocal; repudiation may be by words or by other conduct by
which trustee denies trust and claims property as his own, but
such action must be open and, to be effective, must be brought
home to beneficiary).
Defendants have not adduced any evidence that would support
a finding that Plaintiff knew, prior to 1990, that there had been
a repudiation of the trust or, equally important, that Dean
Witter had participated therein.

To the contrary, Plaintiff was

always led to believe that the losses sustained were nothing more
than the result of a market crash and were not attributable to
any impropriety on the part of the Trustee or any third person
dealing with the Trustee.

It was not until December, 1990, only

days before the Complaint was filed in this matter, that the
discovery of the breach of trust was made.

Neither the statute

nor laches may bar recovery.
In addition, the defense of laches is dependent upon two
elements, to wit: lack of diligence on the part of the Plaintiff
and injury to Defendant owing to such lack of diligence.

Plateau

Mining Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720, 731
(Utah 1990).
1980).

See also:

Leaver v. Groser 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah

As Defendants have wholly failed to produce evidence in

support of either element, their defense of laches must
necessarily fail.
4.

This Court Has Already Ruled That Plaintiff Is
Entitled to Assert These Claims.

As referenced above, this matter has already been taken up
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on appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. While this Court
expressly determined it was not necessary to decide the issue
associated with the statute of limitations, it did comment:
[I]t is clear from the complaint the beneficiary could
prove facts showing she had standing to bring suit against
the third parties for the improper distribution of stock,
she could show, at the very least, the trustee improperly
"neglected" to bring an action against the appellees when he
waited over ten years after the improper transfer and still
did not bring suit.
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, et a h , 841 P.2d 742, 745 (Utah
App. 1992) (emphasis added).

The clear implication of this

holding is that Plaintiff not only has standing to bring her
claims, said claims are not barred by the statute of limitations.
If the Court had found that the statute of limitations barred
Plaintiff's claims, it likely would have ruled that the trial
court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for lack of standing was
harmless error.

Inasmuch as this Court found it unnecessary to

address the statute of limitations issue, in conjunction with its
finding that Plaintiff had standing to bring this suit, there can
be no question that this Court did not believe the same would bar
Plaintiff's claims.
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IX •
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court erred in granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Genuine issues of material fact precluded a

finding that there was a lack of actual knowledge on the part of
Defendants that a violation of the provisions of the Norman
Anderson Trust had occurred.

Similarly, factual issues and the

prior decision of this Court rendered improvident the Trial
Court's determination that Plaintiff lacked standing.

Finally,

triable issues remain with respect to time limitations creating a
bar to Plaintiff's claims.
For the reasons specified herein, it is respectfully
requested that this Court reverse the ruling of the Trial Court
and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this

°\<H day of May, 1995.
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C.

J£MES E. MORTON
A t t o W e y for Plaintiff/
( App^nLant
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JACQUELYNN DAVIS, #6522
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C.
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Telephone: (801) 265-1888
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